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The Right to Voice Reprised 
Christopher Slobogin∗ 
This brief response to Professor Erik Lillquist’s Essay in this book 
focuses on the admissibility of expert psychiatric testimony in the 
wake of Daubert v. Dow Chemical,
1
 the Supreme Court decision that at-
tempts to “scientize” expert testimony.  Most of this Essay thus repris-
es arguments that I made in Proving the Unprovable: The Role of Law, 
Science and Speculation in Adjudicating Culpability and Dangerousness.
2
  
But it also contributes to a larger debate about evidence law, the 
Constitution, and epistemology, all of which could be captured under 
the rubric of the right to voice. 
Testimony from mental health professionals is often based on 
unverified theories and speculation.  Thus, a strict application of 
Daubert might prevent criminal defendants from using opinion testi-
mony from psychiatrists and psychologists to bolster insanity argu-
ments and related defenses.
3
  In Proving the Unprovable, however, I ar-
gued that criminal defendants ought to be able to present this type of 
testimony if the expert has followed a routinized evaluation process 
that addresses the relevant legal criterion (a threshold I labeled with 
the cumbersome phrase “generally accepted content validity,” or 
GACV).
4
  I gave two reasons for this stance: necessity and voice.  First, 
if the law permits defenses based on subjective mental states, as most 
jurisdictions do, it should not be able to bar opinions material to that 
issue on the ground that they are “unscientific” when, as is the case 
with much opinion testimony about past mental state, verifying the 
 
 ∗ Milton Underwood Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. 
 1 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 2 CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE UNPROVABLE: THE ROLE OF LAW, SCIENCE 
AND SPECULATION IN ADJUDICATING CULPABILITY AND DANGEROUSNESS (2007). 
 3 See Michael J. Gottesman, Admissibility of Expert Testimony after Daubert: The 
“Prestige” Factor, 43 EMORY L. J. 867, 875 (1994) (“Are psychiatrists’ assessments of the 
mental capacity of a defendant at the time of the crime ‘testable’ or ‘falsifiable’ or 
‘refutable’? Plainly not. Can we determine the ‘error rate’ of psychiatric opinion, or 
utilize standards to control the technique’s operation? Again, plainly not.”). 
 4 SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 60–62. 
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validity of those opinions is a scientific impossibility.
5
  Second, the 
Constitution can be read to entitle defendants to a chance at telling 
their exculpatory mental state stories through an expert, even if that 
expert’s opinion is not scientifically validated.
6
 
Professor Lillquist’s Essay takes aim at this second rationale, 
which I called the right to voice.
7
 He believes that the right to voice 
cannot be found in the Constitution or the Supreme Court’s con-
struction of the Constitution, and that, in any event, recognition of 
such a right would be a bad idea because it would increase the 
chance of inaccurate outcomes.
8
  When I was offered an opportunity 
to respond to Professor Lillquist’s paper (and appear in the Seton Hall 
Law Review for the third time in a seven-year period!
9
) I jumped at the 
chance to rebut his arguments and elaborate on some of the points 
made in Proving the Unprovable. 
At the outset, I want to note that a close reading of Professor 
Lillquist’s Essay suggests he does not necessarily disagree with the 
primary contention I made in Proving the Unprovable.  There I con-
fined myself to an attack on a rigid application of Daubert to expert 
psychiatric testimony.  Professor Lillquist states at the end of his pa-
per that he does “not reject out-of-hand [the] claim that the defen-
dant’s interest in telling his story may, in some cases, necessitate al-
lowing [speculative expert psychiatric] evidence because the 
defendant otherwise has no way of telling a story with narrative rich-
ness.”
10
  Rather, his main target appears to be the idea that there is a 
more “generalized” right of defendants to submit “any evidence,” in-
cluding hearsay, so long as it is material to the case and not clearly 
untrustworthy.
11
 
I never advanced the latter position in the book, which, again, 
focuses on expert psychiatric testimony.  And in this very journal, in 
an article published two years after the book came out, I emphasized 
that the case for a relaxed approach to expert testimony was much 
weaker for defendant-proffered testimony about past acts (which is 
the usual focus of hearsay testimony) than it is for expert testimony 
 
 5 Id. at 42–53. 
 6 Id. at 53–55. 
 7 Erik Lillquist, The Right to Voice?, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1621 (2010). 
 8 Id. at 1623. 
 9 See Christopher Slobogin, Experts, Mental States, and Acts, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1009 (2008) [hereinafter Slobogin, Mental States and Acts]; Christopher Slobogin, The 
Structure of Expertise in Criminal Cases, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 104 (2003).  
 10 Lillquist, supra note 7, at 1641–42. 
 11 Id. at 2, 1636–42. 
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about past mental states, because actions are amenable to scientific 
investigation while past mental states are intrinsically elusive.
12
  Thus, 
I am not sure that Professor Lillquist and I are very far apart. 
Nonetheless, Professor Lillquist proffers enough criticisms of 
statements I made in Proving the Unprovable to merit a response.  In 
particular, I want to bolster the argument that there is a limited con-
stitutional right to tell exculpatory mental-state stories through ex-
perts and allay Professor Lillquist’s fears that such a right will gener-
ate “inaccurate” verdicts.
13
  In the course of doing so, I will explain 
why my arguments do not require or lead to a more generalized right 
to present a defense; Professor Lillquist’s Essay has helped me see 
that I need to be clearer on that point.  At the same time, at the end 
of this Essay I depart from the psychiatric context and the focus of 
Proving the Unprovable to suggest some reasons why the notion of a 
more generalized right to voice at least ought to be on the table. 
I. THE CONSTITUTION, VOICE, AND EXPERT PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY 
In Rock v. Arkansas, the Supreme Court held that criminal de-
fendants have a constitutional right to testify unless the type of testi-
mony presented is “always so untrustworthy and so immune to the 
traditional means of evaluating credibility that it should disable a de-
fendant from presenting her version of the events for which she is on 
trial.”
14
  In Proving the Unprovable, I argued that expert testimony 
about the defendant’s past mental state that meets the GACV test is 
not always untrustworthy (indeed, because of the scientific void in the 
area, that assessment is usually impossible) and that its speculative na-
ture can easily be exposed to already skeptical judges and juries 
through rebuttal witnesses and cross-examination.
15
  Furthermore, I 
contended, if defendants are prevented from presenting such experts 
they are, in essence, prevented from testifying and thus deprived of 
the constitutional right recognized in Rock.
16
 
 
 12 See Slobogin, Mental States and Acts, supra note 9, at 1012–15.   
 13 Professor Lillquist’s Essay also refers to expert prediction testimony proffered by 
the defense.  Lillquist, supra note 7, at 1621–22.  In this Essay, I focus on culpability 
testimony because my arguments concerning prediction testimony are aimed at Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence rule 403 concerns rather than on probative value.  See 
SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 116–25. 
 14 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987). 
 15 SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 54, 60–66, 86.  
 16 Id. at 55 (“[E]xpert testimony on past mental state presents facts, and infe-
rences based on those facts, that not only support the defendant’s story but may be 
the only source for it.  Prohibiting such evidence would, in effect, prevent the defen-
dant from giving ‘his own version of events in his own words.’”).  Because I base my 
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Professor Lillquist asserts several times that criminal defendants 
raising insanity or diminished capacity claims do not need experts to 
tell stories about their diminished mental state but rather can do so 
on their own, assisted by their attorneys.
17
  But that assertion is patent-
ly wrong; in fact as I mentioned above, Professor Lillquist himself 
backs off of this claim at the end of his Essay.  The typical defendant 
with an alibi defense or who wants to point the finger at someone else 
will have no problem describing the relevant facts.  But the ability of 
the typical defendant asserting a psychiatric defense to talk about his 
own past mental states is vastly circumscribed by a number of unique 
factors that go well beyond the universal risk of impeachment using 
prior crimes.
18
 
First, defendants who want to use psychiatric experts are often 
barely competent to stand trial.
19
  The same mental disorder that 
triggers the possibility of a psychiatric defense also often compromis-
es the ability to communicate.  Although to be triable these defen-
dants must have the capacity to testify relevantly,
20
 many of them will 
be just coherent enough to ensure that they will not sound “crazy,” 
the worst possible condition if the defendant wants to tell a story 
about aberrant past mental state.
21
 
 
argument on Rock and related cases, I do not address the history that Professor Lill-
quist cites, although the fact that defendants were allowed to tell their story through 
unsworn testimony at the time the Constitution was drafted, Lilliquist, supra note 7, 
at 1615, at the least suggests that colonial defendants were entitled to tell their story 
in relatively unrestricted fashion.  
 17 See, e.g., Lillquist, supra note 7, at 1632, 1634, 1639. 
 18 Professor Lillquist correctly notes that I do not try to justify the right to present 
psychiatric experts on the ground that it will allow the defendant to avoid such im-
peachment.  Lillquist, supra note 7, at 1639 n.93.  That is because the right to voice is 
based on the idea that, alone, defendants are unlikely to be able to tell an adequate 
story about impaired past mental state, even if impeachment is not a concern.    
 19 Up to seventy percent of those defendants referred for competency evaluations 
(and thus surmised to be incompetent by their attorneys) are nonetheless found to 
be competent.  See GARY MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE 
COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 141 (3d ed. 
2007). 
 20 See, e.g., FL. R. CRIM. P. 3.211(a)(2) (2008). 
 21 Most defendants with mental illness are competent because of medication, 
which can affect their communication skills.  Cf. Dora W. Klein, Unreasonable: Involun-
tary Medications, Incompetent Criminal Defendants, and the Fourth Amendment, 46 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 161, 183–192 (2009) (describing side effects of medication, including 
cognitive impairment, memory problems, headaches, and slurred speech).  At the 
same time, the medication eliminates the most significant symptoms, which has led 
many defense attorneys to argue, unsuccessfully, that their clients should be taken off 
medication to allow the jury to observe the defendant’s true symptoms.  See, e.g., Rig-
gins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 131 (1992).   
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Second, even if they have no trouble communicating, criminal 
defendants are very unlikely to understand all of the possible motiva-
tions for their crime.  As I stated in Proving the Unprovable: 
[E]ven fully competent defendants may not be aware of, or may 
be unwilling to admit to, crucial aspects of their past mental state.  
For instance, defendants may not suspect the effects of biological, 
childhood, and situational variables on their behavior, deny they 
have mental or relationship problems that in fact explain their 
behavior, or simply claim amnesia.  The best way to obtain all the 
relevant facts about past mental states is to rely on mental health 
professionals, who have special training in and skill at eliciting in-
formation from incompetent, reluctant, or oblivious subjects.
22
 
Finally, even if criminal defendants could figure out and de-
scribe, on their own or with the help of a pretrial expert, the various 
influences on their conduct, they would not be able to put all of this 
information in context.  Only expert witnesses have access to and can 
explicate, based on their own experience and whatever real science 
exists, how the defendant’s character and experience might add up 
to a mitigating mental state.
23
  Experts are needed so that the dispa-
rate aspects of an explanation for criminal behavior—the defendant’s 
own statements, third-party statements, psychiatric records, and psy-
chological tests—can be woven together into a plausible whole. 
The Supreme Court itself recognized all of this when it held, in 
Ake v. Oklahoma, that psychiatric evidence is so important in insanity 
cases that a defendant has a constitutional right to a government-
provided expert if his mental state will be a significant factor at trial.
24
 
[W]hen the State has made the defendant’s mental condition re-
levant to his criminal culpability and to the punishment he might 
suffer, the assistance of a psychiatrist may well be crucial to the 
defendant’s ability to marshal his defense.  In this role, psychiatr-
ists gather facts, through professional examination, interviews, 
and elsewhere, that they will share with the judge or jury; they 
analyze the information gathered and from it draw plausible con-
clusions about the defendant’s mental condition, and about the 
effects of any disorder on behavior; and they offer opinions about 
 
 22 SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 50.    
 23 See Slobogin, Mental States and Acts, supra note 9, at 1024–26 (arguing, after de-
scribing a case study, that without the expert involvement in that case, “nothing 
would have tied all of this information together and, more importantly, nothing 
would have shown how it might provide a (possibly mitigating) explanation for the 
offense”). 
 24 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).  Thus, Professor Lillquist is incorrect when he states 
that I “nowhere” suggest that the Court’s due process cases might form the basis for a 
limited right to voice.  Lillquist, supra note 7, at 1634. 
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how the defendant’s mental condition might have affected his 
behavior at the time in question. . . . Unlike lay witnesses, who can 
merely describe symptoms they believe might be relevant to the 
defendant’s mental state, psychiatrists can identify the “elusive 
and often deceptive” symptoms of insanity, . . . and tell the jury 
why their observations are relevant.
25
 
These considerations also make clear why, contrary to Professor 
Lillquist’s assertion, psychiatric experts are not merely lie detectors, 
assuring the fact finder that the defendant is (or is not) telling the 
truth.
26
  Such experts do rely on the defendant’s statements, but they 
also rely on much more, and even those who testify for the defense 
do not necessarily subscribe to everything the defendant says if it is 
not supported by other evidence.  The goal of the experts in these 
cases is to explain behavior, not simply verify the usually meager, 
meandering account of past mental state the defendant is able to 
give. 
Accordingly, Professor Lillquist is wrong to suggest that United 
States v. Scheffer,
27
 which upheld exclusion of a polygraph taken by the 
defendant,
28
 undercuts the argument for a constitutional right to 
voice.
29
  Instead, as I argued in Proving the Unprovable, Scheffer is at 
worst irrelevant to the argument and perhaps even enhances it.
30
  The 
two primary reasons that the Scheffer majority gave for its holding—
that polygraph results will usurp the jury’s role as the ultimate asses-
sor of truth-telling and that such results do not advance the defen-
dant’s story but rather merely “bolster . . . credibility”
31
—do not apply 
to expert psychiatric evidence.  The usual role of the latter type of 
evidence is to provide a rich narrative of the defendant’s past mental 
state and all of its precursors, not a simple thumbs-up or thumbs-
down on the defendant’s account of his thought process at the time 
 
 25 Ake, 470 U.S. at 80. 
 26 Lillquist, supra note 7, at 1633. 
 27 523 U.S. 303 (1998). 
 28 Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 317. 
 29 Lillquist, supra note 7, 1630 (“Scheffer seems to be a case that strongly argues 
against Professor Slobogin’s position.”). 
 30 SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 54–55. 
 31 523 U.S. at 313, 317.  I also argued that a third reason the Scheffer Court gave 
for its decision—that juries might over-rely on polygraph evidence—does not apply 
to psychiatric evidence, which juries view with skepticism. SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 
54.  Professor Lillquist is right that this rationale was adopted by only a plurality of 
the Court, Lillquist, supra note 7, at 1631, but it was the primary justification for the 
Court’s subsequent decision in Clark v. Arizona, discussed infra at text accompanying 
note 34, and cannot be dismissed as lightly as he does.   
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of the offense.  In other words, psychiatric expert testimony marshals 
facts and interprets them like other forensic experts do. 
Another rationale for Scheffer, advanced by Professor Richard 
Nagareda (although not by the Court), is that exclusionary evidence 
rules that apply equally to the prosecution and the defense—such as 
the ban on polygraph evidence at issue in Scheffer—do not violate the 
Constitution.
32
  Contrary to Professor Lillquist’s suggestion,
33
 my ap-
proach is not inconsistent with that rationale, despite my reliance on 
Rock (which struck down a statute that applied to both prosecution 
and defense evidence
34
).  It is true that I am arguing for an exemp-
tion from a rigid interpretation of Daubert in the special case of past 
mental state evidence.  But I would not limit the exemption to de-
fense testimony; I would be quite willing to extend it to prosecution 
use of evidence about past mental state.  As I pointed out in Proving 
the Unprovable, my approach does not favor the defense over the pros-
ecution.
35
 
Another Supreme Court case, surprisingly not emphasized by 
Professor Lillquist, more forthrightly challenges the right to voice in 
psychiatric cases.  In Clark v. Arizona, decided after Proving the Unprov-
able was published, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution 
does not prevent the state from barring opinion testimony to the ef-
fect that the defendant lacked the mens rea for the offense.
36
  The 
primary justification for this holding was the Court’s perception that 
psychiatric opinion testimony might confuse or mislead juries.
37
  
 
 32 Richard A. Nagareda, Reconceiving the Right to Present Witnesses, 97 MICH. L. REV. 
1063, 1069 (1999) (arguing for a reconception of the right to present witnesses as a 
“right . . . of equal treatment”). 
 33 See, e.g., Lillquist, supra note 7, at 1622, 1627, 1630, 1634 (stating that my ap-
proach to expert psychiatric testimony allows “otherwise inadmissible” evidence to be 
introduced, thus implying that I seek to allow the defense to introduce evidence that 
the prosecution would not be permitted to use).    
 34 Nagareda, supra note 32, at 1141 (noting that the equality rationale would re-
quire reversal of Rock).  
 35 SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE UNPROVABLE, supra note 2, at 134–35.  Of course, the 
prosecution virtually never has occasion to present such evidence except to rebut de-
fendants’ claims of insanity or lack of mens rea. There is, however, one situation 
where the prosecution might want to present speculative expert evidence of past 
mental state in its case-in-chief: testimony about rape trauma syndrome designed to 
show lack of consent on the part of an alleged rape victim.  I have suggested such tes-
timony might be admissible on right to voice grounds, although this time because of 
the (clearly subconstitutional) victim’s right to voice.  See Slobogin, Mental States and 
Acts, supra note 9, at 1029.  
 36 548 U.S. 734 (2006). 
 37 Id. at 774. 
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Based on this case, one might argue that it is not Daubert but rather 
universal Federal Rule 403 concerns—related to jury misuse of the 
evidence—that justify limitations on defense use of psychiatric evi-
dence and defeat a broad right to voice. 
Clark, however, is internally inconsistent on this ground.  Clark 
permits the exclusion of opinion testimony about mens rea (e.g., 
whether, as in Clark, the defendant knew he was shooting a human 
being
38
) while simultaneously suggesting that states may not bar opi-
nion testimony about insanity (e.g., whether, as in Clark, the defen-
dant believed his victim was a space alien trying to kill him
39
).  Yet as 
Clark itself illustrates, testimony supporting an insanity defense will 
often either be identical to or even more far-ranging and speculative 
than testimony about lack of mens rea.
40
  If the distinction that Clark 
makes can be justified, it is not on the ground that mens rea testimo-
ny is more confusing than insanity testimony.  Rather, the distinction 
is based on the assertion that opinion testimony suggesting the de-
fendant lacked intent is more likely to cause inaccurate (defense-
oriented) verdicts, given the fact that the burden of proof is always on 
the prosecution on the mens rea issue (because the Constitution re-
quires it) while the burden on the insanity issue can be (and was in 
Arizona) placed on the defendant.
41
  This concern about accuracy al-
so permeates Professor Lillquist’s critique and is worth investigating 
in some detail because it seems to be his primary reason for rejecting 
a right to voice. 
II. INACCURACY 
Professor Lillquist’s main problem with the right to voice as ap-
plied to psychiatric evidence appears to be that it will allow defen-
dants to hoodwink fact finders, which he believes are easily fooled by 
 
Are there, then, characteristics of mental-disease and capacity evidence 
giving rise to risks that may reasonably be hedged by channeling the 
consideration of such evidence to the insanity issue on which, in States 
like Arizona, a defendant has the burden of persuasion?  We think 
there are: in the controversial character of some categories of mental 
disease, in the potential of mental-disease evidence to mislead, and in 
the danger of according greater certainty to capacity evidence than ex-
perts claim for it. 
Id. 
 38 Id. at 745.   
 39 Id.    
 40 Id. at 773 (“[T]he same evidence that affirmatively shows he was not guilty by 
reason of insanity . . . also shows it was at least doubtful that he could form mens 
rea.”).      
 41 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.  
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psychiatric testimony, or at least unable to assess its true worth.
42
  The 
majority in Clark also seemed to be very concerned about the possibil-
ity that opinion testimony from defense-oriented mental health pro-
fessionals will produce erroneous verdicts.
43
  Like the claim that de-
fendants can adequately tell their story about past mental state 
without expert help, this assumption is off-base. 
The main reason “erroneous” results are unlikely in these cases 
is that, barring malingering (which is very difficult to pull off
44
), an 
opinion about past mental state is not provably inaccurate if it meets 
the GACV test and thus avoids quackery.  As I have already noted, we 
cannot know whether such testimony is right or wrong.  Accordingly, 
it should come under the umbrella of Rock’s constitutional protec-
tion. 
But even if one insists, against the evidence, that psychiatric tes-
timony presented by the defense is more often “wrong” than “right,” 
such testimony is unlikely to cause erroneous verdicts.  Juries and 
judges are naturally skeptical of mental health professionals prof-
fered by criminal defendants in an attempt to mitigate their crimes.  
In Proving the Unprovable, I described the research overwhelmingly 
showing that fact finders tend to discount expert psychiatric testimo-
 
 42 Lillquist, supra note 7, at 1630 (stating that the right to voice would “admit 
otherwise inadmissible evidence: evidence that I believe, if admitted, would frustrate 
the goals of an accurate and orderly outcome.”); id. at 1644 (suggesting that Daubert 
is meant to shield juries from expert testimony when “it is simply beyond the reason-
ing power of people generally, in the limited context of trial, to fully inform them-
selves of all of the limitations of the evidence.”). 
 43 548 U.S. at 779 (“Arizona’s rule serves to preserve the State’s chosen standard 
for recognizing insanity as a defense and to avoid confusion and misunderstanding 
on the part of jurors.”).  Ironically, the Court has no difficulty believing that juries 
are capable of dealing with speculative or prejudicial testimony when the prosecution 
proffers it.  See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 901 n.7 (1983) (The argument that 
psychiatric prediction testimony by state witnesses should be barred because it is un-
reliable “is founded on the premise that a jury will not be able to separate the wheat 
from the chaff. We do not share in this low evaluation of the adversary process.”); 
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (allowing detailed proof of defen-
dant’s prior crimes despite defense willingness to stipulate to them on the ground 
the prosecution “needs evidentiary depth to tell a continuous story”).  Note also that 
Arizona—whose law prohibiting expert opinion testimony about mens rea was 
upheld in Clark—permits the prosecution to introduce rape trauma syndrome testi-
mony.  See State v. Huey, 699 P.2d 1290 (Ariz. 1985). 
 44 See Michael L. Perlin, “The Borderline Which Separates You from Me”: The Insanity 
Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 IOWA 
L. REV. 1375, 1410 (1997) (“Recent carefully-crafted empirical studies have clearly 
demonstrated that malingering among insanity defendants is, and traditionally has 
been, statistically low.  Even where it is attempted, it is fairly easy to discover (if so-
phisticated diagnostic tools are used).”).  See also Slobogin, Mental States and Acts, su-
pra note 9, at 1022–24.  
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ny presented by the defendant.
45
  Indeed, judges and juries are en-
couraged to do so by the law, with its presumption of sanity and its 
permissive inference that a person intends the natural consequences 
of his actions.
46
  Empirical study, involving cases in which psychiatric 
opinion testimony was almost unlimited,
47
 indicates that juries virtual-
ly never find for defendants who raise mens rea issues and agree with 
insanity claims in fewer than half the cases in which they are  raised.
48
 
If anything, unreliable verdicts are more likely to occur when 
fact finders are prevented from hearing articulate evidence counter-
ing their preconceptions and the law’s assumptions.
49
  Probably the 
strongest argument against Clark is that, in effect, the decision elimi-
nates the state’s burden of proving mens rea in psychiatric cases.
50
  
Without opinion testimony rebutting the natural and legal assump-
tion that people intend the consequences of their actions and are 
sane, the defense is left with very little means of challenging the 
state’s case other than the defendant’s own self-serving and easily 
dismissed statements. 
In Proving the Unprovable I also noted that, if the defendant and 
his experts are somehow able to put one over on the fact finder, very 
little damage is done.  Most defendants found insane spend more 
time in a mental hospital than they would spend in prison had they 
 
 45 For instance, I described a meta-review that found that expert social science 
testimony “is scrutinized as intensively as the testimony of any other witness and even 
viewed somewhat cynically.”  SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 86.  
 46 See WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 426 (4th ed. 2003) (describing universal pre-
sumption of sanity); see also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 522–23 (1979) (al-
lowing permissive inference instruction).  
 47 The studies were all conducted pre-Daubert.  But as I point out in Proving the 
Unprovable (and contrary to Professor Lillquist’s assertion, Lillquist, supra note 7, at 
1), even post-Daubert very few courts have limited psychiatric opinion testimony on 
past mental state.  See SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 27–28 (describing studies indicating 
that Daubert has had little impact on the admissibility of such testimony).  
 48 Contested insanity cases succeed about twenty-five percent of the time.  See 
MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 203.  Lack-of-mens-rea cases are successful much less 
often.  See Slobogin, Mental States and Acts, supra note 9, at 1018 n.36. 
 49 Several commentators have documented the hostility that courts and juries 
have toward insanity pleas even in cases of serious mental disorder at the time of the 
offense.  See generally Michael Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of 
Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 700 (1989–90) (“Where a 
defendant does not show ‘flagrant psychotic symptomatology,’ does not behave like a 
‘wild beast,’ or where his behavior does not have apparent organic roots, ‘pervasive 
judicial hostility’ toward the use of the defense constantly surfaces.”). 
 50 See Peter Westen, The Supreme Court’s Bout with Insanity: Clark v. Arizona, 4 
OHIO. ST. J. CRIM. L. 143 (2006).  Professor Westen argues that Clark is only about 
burdens of persuasion, not evidentiary admissibility.  Id. at 156–61. But I think he is 
wrong for reasons given by Professor Alan Michaels.  See id. at 163–65.  
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been convicted.
51
  The very few defendants who succeed with a lack-of 
mens rea or diminished responsibility defense are still convicted, al-
beit of a lesser crime.
52
  The specter of hundreds or thousands of de-
fendants walking free because they are able to fool both their own 
experts and a judge and jury is simply not realistic.  Indeed, many de-
fendants with serious mental illness actively resist psychiatric defenses 
because of the consequences and the associated stigma.
53
 
Finally, contrary to Professor Lillquist’s apparent position, accu-
racy is not necessarily the dominant goal of the criminal justice sys-
tem.
54
  The right to testify announced in Rock exists in part because 
preventing a defendant from telling a plausible story about past men-
tal state would be unjust and unfair, regardless of its speculative na-
ture.
55
  The right to voice, allowing a defendant to tell his story 
through an expert, should exist for the same reason, even if inaccu-
racy occasionally occurs as a result.  Defendants and society at large 
would seriously question a process that forced defendants asserting 
mental state defenses to rely solely on their own descriptions of their 
past mental states, bereft of expert opinion interpreting how and why 
those mental states occurred.
56
 
III. A GENERAL RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE 
Stemming as it does from the right to testify, the right to voice I 
advanced in Proving the Unprovable was meant to be limited to those 
situations where an expert is testifying in lieu of, or as an interpreter 
of, the defendant’s testimony.  So construed, the right would not jus-
tify allowing defendants to present hearsay testimony of the type Pro-
 
 51 SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 142. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Perlin, supra note 44, at 1412 (“[I]t is much more likely that seriously mentally 
disabled criminal defendants will feign sanity in an effort not to be seen as mentally 
ill, even where such evidence might serve as powerful mitigating evidence in death 
penalty cases.”); Xavier F. Amador & Andrew A. Shiva, Insight into Schizophrenia:  Ano-
sognosia, Competency, and Civil Liberties, 11 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 25, 26–39 
(2000) (discussing prevalence of “lack of insight” among people with psychosis). 
 54 Lillquist, supra note 7, at 1636 (“The primary aim of the law of evidence and 
procedure is to reach accurate outcomes.”). 
 55 Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51 (1987) (“A person’s right to . . . an opportunity 
to be heard in his defense . . .  [is] basic in our system of jurisprudence”) (emphasis in 
original) (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948)).  
 56 See SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 55–56.  Professor Lillquist states that my ap-
proach “certainly will give the public the impression that the trial process favors the 
defendant.”  Lillquist, supra note 7, at 1642.  My guess is that his approach, which 
would bar speculative psychiatric testimony, will look pro-prosecution to a much 
greater extent than my approach looks pro-defendant.  
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fessor Lillquist critiques, including the specific example he hypothe-
sizes involving testimony describing the alleged confession of a now-
deceased individual, to the effect that he committed the crime with 
which the defendant is charged.
57
  Aside from one passage meant to 
set the stage for its arguments about psychiatric testimony,
58
 Proving 
the Unprovable did not address the general right to present relevant 
defense evidence that is the primary target of Professor Lillquist’s Es-
say.  But in this response to Professor Lillquist, I want to go forth-
rightly down that road, albeit only for a brief spell, by cataloguing 
some of the reasons courts and commentators have given for what 
has been variously called the right “to present witnesses,” the right “to 
present a defense,” or the right “to free proof.”
59
  In contrast to the 
circumscribed right to voice that I advanced in Proving the Unprovable, 
this broader right presumptively allows the defense to introduce oth-
erwise inadmissible evidence beyond the defendant’s own thoughts 
and statements or interpretations thereof. 
The first broad category of justifications for such a right relies on 
history and precedent relating to the right to compulsory process and 
the right to confront the state’s evidence, both guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment.  As Peter Westen, Jancy Hoeffel, and others have 
argued, Supreme Court precedent construing these clauses could 
provide a solid basis for entitling criminal defendants to present any 
material evidence on their behalf.
60
  For instance, in Chambers v. Mis-
sissippi, the Court bluntly declared that “[f]ew rights are more fun-
damental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own de-
 
 57 Lillquist, supra note 7, at 1640. 
 58 SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 139. 
 59 See generally David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1 
(discussing developments in the constitutional law of proof).     
 60 Peter Westen, Compulsory Process II, 74 MICH. L. REV. 191, 203 (1975) (“[T]he 
defendant has a constitutional right to produce any witnesses whose ability to give 
reliable evidence is something about which reasonable people can differ.”); Jancy 
Hoeffel, The Sixth Amendment’s Lost Clause: Unearthing Compulsory Process, 2002 WIS. L. 
REV. 1275, 1276 (2002) (The compulsory process clause entitles the criminal defen-
dant to present all material evidence.); Katherine Goldwasser, Vindicating the Right to 
Trial by Jury and the Requirement of Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Critique of the Con-
ventional Wisdom about Excluding Defense Evidence, 86 GEO. L. J. 621, 639 (1998) (Relia-
bility-based exclusionary rules impair the right to jury because jurors are more likely 
to “give meaningful consideration to . . . the unusual, unexpected, or even implausi-
ble stories criminal defendants sometimes bring to court.”); Robert N. Clinton, The 
Right to Present a Defense:  An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. 
L. REV. 711, 808–09 (1976) (“[T]he admission of hearsay evidence with no extrinsic 
indicia of reliability might be constitutionally compelled if the evidence is of critical 
importance to the accused.”).  
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fense.”
61
  That language suggests that the state needs a compelling 
reason to abrogate the right.  At the least, as Rock stated with respect 
to the right to testify, it would not be stretching constitutional doc-
trine to conclude that limitations on the right to present a defense 
should not be “arbitrary or disproportionate.”
62
  Thus, even Justice 
Rehnquist, who was no fan of defendants’ rights, wrote an opinion 
that requires the state to produce witnesses under the compulsory 
process clause when the defendant provides “some showing that the 
evidence lost [is] both favorable and material.”
63
 
Professor Lillquist’s real concern, however, is not defense pres-
entation of declarants in court, but rather defense presentation of 
hearsay statements described by a witness other than the declarant 
(in Professor Lillquist’s hypothetical, incriminating statements by a 
deceased person described by the defendant’s cousin).
64
  Even here 
the Court’s cases are not particularly supportive of his point of view, 
at least as applied to the confessing-declarant scenario that he hypo-
thesizes.  In Chambers, for instance, the Court held that the prosecu-
tion could not rely on the state hearsay ban to exclude “critical” hear-
say statements exculpating Chambers and incriminating the 
declarant, at least when the declarant is available for cross-
examination by the prosecution.
65
  And in Holmes v. South Carolina, 
the Court reversed a conviction because the state excluded state-
ments against penal interest by a declarant who was not available for 
cross-examination.
66
  It is true, as Professor Lillquist notes, that Holmes 
also emphasized trial courts’ authority to implement “well-established 
rules of evidence [that] exclude evidence if its probative value is out-
weighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion 
of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.”
67
  But Holmes itself illu-
strates that even when the weight of the evidence indicates that the 
 
 61 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973). 
 62 Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987) (“[R]estrictions of a defendant’s right 
to testify may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed 
to serve.”). 
 63 United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 873 (1982). 
 64 Lillquist, supra note 7, at 1640. 
 65 410 U.S. at 302 (noting, as an additional reason for the holding, that the state 
did not allow Chambers to cross-examine the declarant).  
 66 547 U.S. 319 (2006).  The declarant had been cross-examined at a pretrial 
hearing.  Id. at 323. 
 67 Id. at 326. 
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defense’s hearsay is unreliable, the Constitution requires that it be 
admitted.
68
 
At least in Holmes the defendant was able to produce some evi-
dence corroborating the hearsay.
69
 In Professor Lillquist’s example, 
the defendant’s only proffer is the testimony of his cousin, who will 
state that the cousin’s cellmate confessed to the murder that the 
prosecution says the defendant committed.  Perhaps here we finally 
have a situation where exclusion would not be “arbitrary and dispro-
portionate.”  But why assume, as Professor Lillquist apparently does, 
that the cousin’s testimony will lead to inaccuracy?  What if he is not 
lying?  And why shouldn’t we allow the defendant to put the cousin 
on the stand (whether or not the declarant is dead or otherwise un-
available) with confidence that the prosecution will point to the ob-
vious reasons why the cousin should be disbelieved and with know-
ledge that the jury will be extremely skeptical of any story the cousin 
tells?
70
 
Two authors have recently argued that exclusion in this situation 
may be immoral, if not unconstitutional.  Relying on Kant, Scanlon, 
and other philosophers, as well as First Amendment principles, Pro-
fessor Todd E. Pettys argues that “honoring jurors’ deliberative au-
tonomy is an important moral value” that ought to be considered in 
constructing rules of evidence.
71
  Just as the speech guarantee reflects 
a moral judgment that the government offends its citizens’ delibera-
tive autonomy when it restricts speech on the basis of fears about 
what that speech might cause citizens to believe, the rules of evidence 
should allow juries, which are also a vital part of self-government, to 
hear evidence that is relevant, even if its reliability is in doubt.
72
  With 
 
 68 Id. at 328–29 (noting lower courts’ finding that there was “strong evidence of 
guilt”). 
 69 Id. at 322–23 (noting defendant’s evidence that the forensic evidence prof-
fered by the state was contaminated because of flawed procedures and that police 
tried to frame him). 
 70 I am focusing here, as Professor Lillquist does, on accuracy.  There may be rea-
sons to avoid a broad right to present a defense that are not related to accuracy per 
se.  See, e.g., Nagareda, supra note 32, at 1098–1108 (noting “floodgates” problem—
that a right to present a defense could do away with all hearsay, impeachment, and 
privilege limitations); id. at 1137–41 (noting why defendants might prefer a symme-
trical approach to evidence rules); see also Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417–18 
(1988) (permitting exclusion of a defense witness as a sanction for non-compliance 
with discovery rules). 
 71 Todd E. Pettys, The Immoral Application of Exclusionary Rules, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 
463, 468 (2008). 
 72 Id. at 467–68, 496 (“The voting booth and the jury box are the two central fo-
rums in which American citizens exercise their right to govern themselves.”). 
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respect to hearsay in particular, Professor Pettys concludes that rather 
than “ban hearsay unless it falls within an exception . . . we should 
generally permit hearsay and focus our exception-drafting energies 
on identifying those circumstances in which the risk of irrational 
overreliance is particularly great.”
73
 
Note further that Professor Pettys’s jury-autonomy rationale 
would support use of hearsay by any party to a dispute, defense or 
prosecution.  Unfortunately for those interested in an even playing 
field, however, the Court’s current expansive interpretation of the 
Confrontation Clause poses a serious counterweight to prosecution 
use of hearsay.
74
  Unless that case law is modified (which is unlikely, 
given its recency), implementation of Professor Pettys’ approach 
would create significant asymmetry between prosecution and defense 
ability to use hearsay. 
Based on the work of Thomas Hobbes, Professor Alice Ristroph, 
one of Professor Lillquist’s colleagues, has proffered an elegant new 
argument as to why such asymmetry is permissible and perhaps even 
required.
75
  Hobbes believed that every accused individual, even one 
who is clearly guilty, has a right to resist punishment.
76
  Professor Ri-
stroph explains that, to Hobbes, the right of self-defense exists not 
only in a state of nature but also once humans submit to government 
authority, and it is not forfeited simply because one has committed a 
crime.
77
  To Hobbes, punishment is a “bit dirty,”
78
 an act of violence 
that every individual—innocent or guilty—has a right to resist.
79
 
If one agrees with these conclusions, Professor Ristroph suggests, 
they point toward a rationale for various criminal procedure rights 
that typically help the guilty as much as or more than the innocent, 
and assuredly do not help the prosecution.  As she puts it, “[i]n addi-
tion to whatever truth-seeking function the right to silence, the right 
 
 73 Id. at 508.  Professor Lillquist states that a juror’s right should not be trans-
muted into a defendant’s right. Lillquist, supra note 7, at 1644.  Of course, that is 
precisely what the Court did in Batson v. Kentucky. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (finding that 
African-American members of the jury pool have the right to prevent discriminatory 
exclusion from the jury, exercisable by the defendant).   
 74 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (prohibiting prosecution use 
of out-of-court statements made in anticipation of criminal prosecution unless the 
declarant is available at trial or has been cross-examined by the defendant). 
 75 Alice Ristroph, Respect and Resistance, 97 CAL. L. REV. 601 (2009). 
 76 Id. at 616 (“This right to resist belongs to the guilty as well as the innocent.”). 
 77 Id. at 614–15. 
 78 Id. at 622. 
 79 Id. at 619 (“[T]he sovereign and the criminal each have a ‘blameless liberty’ to 
use violence for self-preservation . . . .”). 
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to present a defense, and other rights of the accused may serve, they 
are also mechanisms of self-preservation.”
80
  She singles out the right 
to present a defense—the “right to try to exculpate” oneself—as par-
ticularly “within the Hobbesian view that there is no duty to submit to 
punishment.” 
81
  This right to resist, of course, is only the defendant’s, 
and thus would justify asymmetrical evidentiary rules. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Despite the immediately preceding commentary, I am ambiva-
lent about a robust right to present a defense that permits the defen-
dant to present virtually any evidence he or she desires.
82
  As the 
name implies, Proving the Unprovable dealt only with a particular type 
of defense argument—past mental state—that creates unique and se-
rious epistemological difficulties.  Unlike defense contentions using 
hearsay or other evidence that focuses on physical conditions, credi-
ble defense claims of insanity or lack of mens rea generally cannot re-
ly on the defendant or lay witnesses alone, nor are they easily suscept-
ible to scientific proof. Given the latter fact, expert opinions about 
past mental state are, as far as we know, just as likely to be reliable as 
not, at least if they are based on accepted evaluation procedures and 
address the relevant legal and clinical criteria.  Nor does relaxation of 
the usual evidentiary requirements—in this case Daubert—to permit 
this type of testimony give the defense an asymmetric advantage, giv-
en the fact that the prosecution usually only needs expertise on past 
mental state when the defense decides to use it first.  For all of these 
reasons, Professor Lillquist is off-base when he asserts that the right to 
voice I espouse “presumably is broader than its particular applica-
tions in Proving the Unprovable” and supports a “generalized” right of 
defendants to present evidence.
83
   However, I do insist that, in telling 
stories about past mental states, criminal defendants’ voices need to 
be heard through experts, who should not be silenced simply because 
they cannot demonstrate a solid scientific basis for their opinions.   
 
 
 80 Id. at 630. 
 81 Ristroph, supra note 75, at 630.  
 82 I find much to admire in a symmetrical approach to the rules of evidence.  See 
generally Nagareda, supra note 32.  Further, Professor Ristroph suggests that Hobbes’ 
right to resist might be confined to defendants’ choice “to speak (or have others 
speak on their behalf).”  Ristroph, supra note 75, at 629.  Both of these considera-
tions argue for a right to voice limited to the types of situations discussed in Proving 
the Unprovable.  
 83 Lillquist, supra note 7, at 1622.  
